The Fourth District Court of Utah (Judge Derek Pullan)
recently issued a ruling on the motions for summary judgment filed in the Utah Stream Access Coalition v. State of Utah case regarding stream access on the
Provo River.
The court begin its ruling by holding that to the extent
that Utah Code section 73-29-103 purports to interpret the Constitution and determine
the constitutionality of HB 141, it violates Article V of the Utah Constitution.
The court noted that Article V, Section1 prohibits the legislature from exercising the powers of the judicial branch,
and that it is the judiciary’s responsibility to determine what the
Constitution means and whether a statute violates the Constitution. The court noted, however, that “[a]t best,
the statute constitutes an expression of legislative intent and nothing more.”
The court next held that Article XVII, Section 1 of the Utah
Constitution recognizes and confirms public ownership of water in the state, as
well as the public easement derived from that ownership. The defendants had argued that the public
easement recognized in the JJNP and Conatser cases is a creature of statute,
but the court held otherwise. The court
cited prior case law and Utah history to support its conclusion that “public
ownership of natural waters has always been, independent of any statutory
grant.” The court concluded that this also
encompassed corollary rights, including the public’s recreational easement
recognized in JJNP and Conatser.
Next, the court held that the Utah legislature has the
authority to regulate use of waters owned by the public and the recreational
easement derived therefrom. The court
noted that public ownership of the water and recreational easement does not eliminate
the legislature’s authority to regulate; rather, the public ownership is the
basis for the regulatory authority.
The court then had to determine whether HB 141 did more than
regulate use. USAC contended that HB 141
essentially transferred a public asset to private ownership without compensation. The court, however, did not agree with this
contention. The court concluded that HB
141 regulates the extent to which the public may use the public easement, but
did not transfer or destroy the easement.
The court next had to determine whether the legislature’s
regulatory authority is limited by Article XX of the Utah Constitution. Article XX, Section 1 of the Utah
Constitution provides that public lands are held by the State in trust for the
benefit of its citizens, and may be disposed of for a public purpose or as
provided by law. The court concluded
that the recreational easement constitutes an interest in land, and is
therefore covered by Article XX. However,
because HB 141 did not dispose of the easement, it did not implicate the trust
responsibilities imposed by Article XX.
Finally, the court reached the question of whether the
public trust doctrine applies. The court
first looked at the federal public trust doctrine. The court concluded that because HB 141 did
not give the public easement to a private party, the federal public trust
doctrine does not apply. The court then
noted that Utah case law recognizes a state public trust doctrine, under which
the State regulates the use of water as trustee for the benefit of the people,
and that this public trust doctrine applies to both navigable and non-navigable
waters. The court noted, however, that
the nature and scope of the state public trust doctrine has not been
well-defined in case law, and that the parties in this case had not had
sufficient opportunity to brief the issue of the state public trust doctrine. The court noted that “considerable deference”
should be given to legislative decisions relating to the use of state waters,
but that regulations that are illegal, arbitrary, capricious, or in clear
violation of trust purposes are subject to judicial review. The court asked the parties to submit
additional briefing on the state public trust doctrine, after which the court
will make a decision on this issue, which appears to be the sole remaining
issue in the case.